Given that there is a discriminatory aspect to how these programs were implemented in NY, and by extention, are likely to be implemented in Philly - do you think that in some form, the citizens need to be asked to weigh in on whether this kind of program should be implemented?

What if the information you've provided is widely known, and still such programs are popular?

Good post man. I only know experiences from my friends and family, but I'm glad that there is some data corroborating what we have always thought to be true.

Here are New York's numbers again:

* In 2002 (last year with released data the past one), New York stopped 97,296 people and arrested 2,819.
* In 2006, they stopped 508,540 people and arrested 5,317.
* Summonses (does this mean minor non-misdemeanor violations that got swept up?) went from 1,461 in 2002 to 7,292 last year.

So the stops increased more than five times over, and the arrests just fell short of doubling. I think it is crucial to ask what level of efficacy we are will to accept, as the number of innocent people stopped rises with the number of stops.

It is also crucial to turn attention to trying to measure the drop in gun crimes, not just the rise in arrest rates. From the Inquirer:

Experts say the odds that a New York-style program can drive down homicides in Philadelphia will depend on several things, including the city's relatively high rate of legal gun ownership. What has appeared to cure the problem elsewhere might not work perfectly here, the experts say.

In 1990, three-quarters of New York's homicides were committed with guns, although few of its citizens legally owned guns, writes Berkeley law professor Franklin Zimring in The Great American Crime Decline, due out next month.

That meant that when police removed "the relatively thin layer" of crime guns from New York's streets, they were not easily replaced through burglaries or straw purchases, in which legally bought guns are later sold to those not permitted to own them.

In Philadelphia, by contrast, an even larger share - 87 percent - of homicides are committed with guns, Johnson said, and more than 32,000 permits to carry concealed weapons have been issued to city residents since the state gun law made it easier in 1995.

Additionally, I think it is crucial to clearly define and limit the factors that police may use to constitute "articulable suspicion" enough to justify a stop. The broader the permitted justification ("Strawberry Mansion is a high-crime area") the greater the room for bias to determine who is stopped and the more intrusive the stop-and-frisk initiative is to people who are only in that high-crime area because they live or work or shop there. Targeting a stop and frisk program to very specific locations with ongoing histories of reported crime would help remove some of the risk of bias.

I want to look at the constitutional issues raised by stop and frisk as part of a mayoral declaration of a state of emergency, as well as the historical reasons for Philadelphia recently shying away from aggressive stop and frisk.

Jennifer

Well, was NYs city wide?

As I recall from nutter's policy, designated high crime zones are only going to have "stop and frisk" policies coupled with a curfew. If you are out past curfew in those boundaries, you can be frisked for illegal weapons.

So, inherently yes, blacks will be targeted because these high crime areas are overwhelmingly black resident.

I would be very skeptical if it was a city wide proposal. I am a bit more ok on it if the plan is with strict parameters:

1) thresholds required to be a high crime area to be targeted for emergency powers.
2) specified radius from pinpointed epicenter.
3) thresholds that if met, remove it from emergency powers
4) some sort of board to address complaints to to be handled promptly
5) no reporting of identities stopped unless illegal activity or an illegal weapon was seized
6) Officers in emergency zones are specially trained for this process
7) Frisks should be quick with minimal detainment (if it takes more than 5 minutes with a cooperating individual, it is too long)
8) clearly specified curfew hours

etc.

Everything would need to be specifically laid out with no vague generalizations.

I would really want to know how the numbers have changed in NYC since 2002 and 2006. In 2002, the police commissioner was Bernard Kerik, who as is well-documented, was a total tool. The commissioner since 2002, Raymond Kelly, has publicly and repeatedly said that racial profiling, whether for street crime, terrorism, or traffic tickets, does not work. The New Yorker had an excellent article a few years back on how the NYC has changed its tactics under Kelly; I'll try to dig it up.

This doesn't necessarily mean that there haven't been notable or unnoticed incidents of profiling, or that Kelly isn't hiding the data for a sinister reason or talking out both sides of his mouth, or that stop-and-frisk isn't a de facto racial profiling program under a different rationale, or that the program in Philly won't be a lot worse than the program in New York. But there are good reasons not to assume all of those things.

Raiderdam:

Read Esquisite's comments above.

Can anyone a little older or smarter than me discuss the relative successes of "Operation Sunrise" and the relative failure of "Safe Streets" and what lessons there maybe are for this current spate of policies targeting drug-related and other violent crime?

Jennifer

Unfortunately, I do not have time to write as extensively as I would like about Nutter's stop and frisk plan. But I've heard Nutter talk about it, and here are some of the things I heard him say (I'm paraphrasing of course):

Last year, we had 406 murders. 296 of those murders were black men (73%). 85% were black people. These murders were committed by other black men with handguns. 99.9% of the murders committed with a handgun were illegal handguns.

Now, if the KKK came through town and killed 296 black men, everyone would be up in arms. We would call the National Guard, the FBI, the CIA, and every other three letter agency we have. Did you see how the General Assembly "sprung into action" with outrage when a state highway was backed up for 3 inches of snow? Then why aren't they springing into action when 296 black men are killed. Where's the outrage? What the administration is doing is not working. I'm outraged. We have to get serious about addressing this thing.

What do you want me to do? We can't wait 10 years or 10 months. We can't wait for another 400 people to be murdered. We need to do something right now!

This year, we are on pace to beat the murder-rate from last year. We have more murders this year than any other city. More than New York, more than Chicago, more than LA. New York has more than 5 times the population we have with 8 million people!

When New York implemented the stop and frisk policy, their murders dropped 75%. I believe in constitutional rights, but I also believe in public safety. I believe that people have the right to walk down the street and not get shot! Are we going to get serious about this or not? I can't wait for another 400-800 people to get killed when we can do something right now.

Most of the people talking about constitutional rights don't live in these neighborhoods that are like battlefields. They don't know what it's like to be ducking bullets everyday. People in those neighborhoods want us to do something! It is more dangerous to be a black man in Philadelphia, then it is to be in Iraq.

I heard Nutter speak several times on this issue. Those are some of the things I heard him say. He's said more, but those are the things that I remember. And as a black man living in Strawberry Mansion, I agree with him. People are prisoners in their own home. Children can't even go out to play.

As far as the research is concerned, I suggest you guys read his policy paper and check his sources. If you read it already, read it again.

On March 20th, I believe Michael Nutter will be hosting a panel discussion on the stop and frisk policy at the African-American Art Museum. I don't have all the details, but when I get them I'll let you guys know.

I believe the panel will consists of some combination of civil rights lawyers, law enforcement, african-american community representatives, criminologists, and Michael Nutter. Mark your calenders for March 20th. Again, when I get more info, I'll let you know.

I'm suprised that we haven't heard from you on this issue Ray. I believe that Dan called out Nutter and Fattah. I'm trying my hardest to defend Nutter.

Are you going to defend Fattah?

I don't really have anything new to add, but want to say what I'm getting out of reading the interesting comments.

The more I read, the more worried I become about the S&F concept.

We need a close analysis of what is the real rationale for a S&F program. If it unrealistic to look to such programs as a way to effectively reduce the number of guns on the street (because the source of the guns won't be closed off), and instead if the rationale is to serve as a deterrent to crime, then we need to be asking whether S & F programs are the most effective deterrent.

Not that we don't need to use more than one tool, but wouldn't it make more sense to focus on having more beat cops, cops on bikes, and initiatives foced on having cops and other players in law enforcement connecting more closely to our communities? And what about the potential of S & F programs to exacerbate divisions between cops and our communities? That means that any such programs need to be very carefully constructed.

And I'm not getting the sense that they have been. I wonder if a Stop and Frisk program will become more of a campaign/public relations tactic than a well thought out crime-fighting tactic. And the nebulous nature of the "state of emergency," threshold, and the vagueness of some other criteria that I've seen explained so far is worrisome:

What exactly does "prohibit or limit gatherings of people on sidewalks, streets, or any outdoor place in the designated neighborhoods" mean?

What does "halt or limit the movement of vehicles through or within the designated neighborhoods" mean?

Outside of questions about whether "guns kill people" or "people kill people," the relationship between numbers of guns and the murder rate is very complicated. But it is clear that for a large number of the murders that do take place, settling a dispute by shooting someone was the operational motivation.

We need to start widespread and comprehensive conflict resolution and peer mediation programs in our schools. We need to teach kids there are ways to solve conflicts without using a gun.

Further, we need to build bridges and channels of communication between the law enforcement community and the community at large.

On efficacy: Here's some of the summary from a review of the Kansas study that Nutter cites as support for stop and frisk. In terms of numbers, the data seems to show a drop in gun crime. The study is "Police crackdowns on illegal gun carrying: a systematic review of their impact on gun crime," published in the Journal of Experimental Criminology, and I can email anyone interested it or the original study.

METHODS:
From July 1992 through January 1993, police in Kansas City implemented evening
gun patrols in a 0.6-square-mile patrol beat with 4,528 residents and a homicide
rate roughly 20 times the national average (Sherman and Rogan 1995; see also
Sherman et al. 1995). Changes in gun crime were examined during the 29
intervention weeks relative to the prior 29 weeks. The study also examined changes
based on 52-week pre- and postintervention periods (the 52-week postintervention
period included the 29 intervention weeks and 23 weeks after the patrols ended).

Changes in gun crime in the target area were contrasted with changes in a
comparison area several miles away. Both areas had homicide rates many times the
national average, had virtually identical numbers of drive-by shootings in 1991,
and were overwhelmingly black. Moreover, the areas had similar gun crime trends
during the three and a half years prior to the intervention: oscillating but generally
stable levels from 1989 through the first half of 1991, followed by an upswing
before the beginning of the intervention period.

***
RESULTS:
Total gun crimes—which consisted primarily of violent crimes with guns (i.e.,
robberies and assaults) but also included property crimes committed with guns
(primarily destruction of property)—fell by 49% in the target area, from 169 in the
29 weeks prior to the patrols to 86 during the 29-week intervention period (see
Table 3). This change was statistically significant in a t-test of weekly means.
Similarly, an interrupted time series analysis based on the 52 weeks before the
program and the 52 weeks following the start of the program suggested a drop of
2.6 gun crimes per week (or about 44%) after controlling for temporal trends.14 As
reported below, there was some evidence that the patrols may have reduced
homicides and drive-by shootings, but there were no reported changes in total
crimes, overall violent or property crimes, or disorderly behavior. Substitution of
crimes without firearms was not assessed.

Though gun seizures did decline in the comparison area, there were no
statistically significant changes in gun seizures or gun crime in the comparison
beat. Direct statistical tests between the target and comparison areas were not
reported.

After a 5-month pause, the patrols were reintroduced from July 1993 to
December 1993. The evaluators reported that gun crime again declined in the
target area while rising in the comparison area, though they did not present details
regarding the patrols or regarding crime trends during this second phase. In
addition, contrasts of the two 6-month intervention periods with all other half-year
periods from 1991 through 1993 suggested that the patrols reduced both homicides
(based on chi-square tests) and drive-by shootings (based on analysis of variance)
in the target area while these crimes remained unchanged in the comparison area.15
Finally, surveys suggested that gun patrols had strong community support and had
favorable impact on residents’ perceptions of neighborhood conditions and fear of
crime (Shaw 1995).16

***
EFFECT ON NEIGHBORING AREAS:
To investigate geographic displacement of gun crime, the investigators used both t-
tests (for 29-week pre- and postperiods) and interrupted time series models (for 52-
week pre- and postperiods) to examine preYpost changes in the seven beats
adjacent to the target beat, both individually and collectively (see Table 3). None
of these beats experienced a statistically meaningful increase in gun crime.
Collectively, the adjacent beats had a nonsignificant net increase of 52 gun crimes
(7%) during the 29 intervention weeks—which would not wholly offset a reduction
of 83 in the target area— and a nonsignificant drop for the 52 weeks spanning the
intervention and the follow-up period. Further, the city as a whole had a 2% drop
in gun crime during the 29 intervention weeks, providing no obvious sign of
displacement elsewhere.

Interestingly, the review also looks at an Indianapolis study that compares two approaches to cracking down on illegal guns (an compares both to a third district with no change in policing). Here's an explanation of the differences in approach:

METHODS:
Officers implemented different styles of patrol in the two target areas (see
Table 2). In the east target area, officers pursued a general deterrence strategy in
which they sought to maximize traffic stops, thereby seizing more guns and
creating a general sense of enhanced police presence. In the north area, officers
made pedestrian and vehicle stops more selectively, utilizing a targeted offender
approach that focused on particularly suspicious persons and vehicles. Officers in
the north area also paired with probation officers to conduct home visits of
probationers. During the 90-day intervention period, officers spent 2,905 hours
patrolling the east/general deterrence area, making 3,826 vehicle stops and 558
arrests. In the north/targeted offender area, officers spent 1,975 hours on patrol,
making 1,417 vehicle stops, 434 arrests, and 126 probation checks.17

RESULTS:
During the intervention period, total gun crime dropped 29% in the north/targeted
offender area relative to the same 90-day period of the prior year (from 75 to 53;
see Table 3).19 In addition, gun assaults and armed robberies (including those with
guns and other weapons) both declined about 40%, and homicides dropped from
seven to one. Based on analysis of variance tests, the reductions in gun assaults and
armed robberies were statistically significant relative to the comparison area, where
gun and weapon offenses increased and homicides remained unchanged.
In the east/general deterrence area, homicides dropped from four to zero, but
other gun crimes rose. Contrasts of the east/general deterrence and comparison areas
produced mixed and nonsignificant results. Total gun crimes, for example, increased
36% in the former but only 8% in the latter. On the other hand, total homicides, gun
assaults, and armed robberies rose 22% in the east/general deterrence area (from 54
to 66) and 89% in the comparison area (from 38 to 72).20

***
Taking the results at face value, the targeted offender gun patrols may have
been successful, but the general deterrence patrols appear to have made little
difference. The targeted offender patrol style may have enabled officers to focus
their attention more efficiently and effectively on people and places at highest risk
for gun violence; however, one might question whether the patrol styles interacted
with differences between the target areas in crime, racial composition, and other
factors.23

Another interesting finding: neither Kansas or Indianapolis seemed to suffer displacement of criminal activity into adjacent areas (or crime reduction for that matter).

Jennifer

What's so surprising about that study is that overall crime wasn't reduced, just gun crimes.

My common sense analysis would be that increased police presence would reduce crime overall. Didn't seem to happen. Which would suggest that increased numbers of beat cops and cops on bikes wouldn't make much difference either.

I don't quite know how to wrap my mind around that one.

My brother lives in Denver where they have recently started a "Stop and Frisk" program. This effectively just scares the law bidding Denver population. On the plus side S&F does reduce the number of guns carried illegally.

Drug dealers carry firearms as a necessary part of doing business. They will carry guns because they have to. This is true no matter what the law - S&F not withstanding. S&F does reduce the the illegal possession of hand guns by people who carry for the heck of it. I grew up in the 75th Police precinct in East New York, Brooklyn. They find a dead body there every 63 hours. This is the most dangerous precinct in the City. The Giulliani (sp?) program didn't dent the illegal possession on my block. When folks fear for their lives, many will carry illegally.

What we need is community policing and involvement. The real issue is safety and security. If you feel safe, you won't feel the need to illegally carry a firearm. Growing up where I did, left me left me pretty fearless as I know how far my wits will take me.

I disagree with my friend and next D.A. Seth Williams, although I believe he fully understands the issues. I'm not convinced that Chaka does understand the situation. I'm also not convinced that Chaka Davenport was shot, as claimed, either.